Gaza Strip: Between early treatment and strategies of “eat to survive”
Ahmed Al-Sourani, Agricultural Development Association (PARC) – Gaza, May 24, 2009
Article in Arabic
Recently, at the local and international levels, both governmental and non-governmental, there has been decided the urgent needs for the relief of the agricultural sector in Gaza Strip. However, as it is apparent, there are numerous challenges and risks that a large number of people, institutions, and authorities concerned do not apprehend such as:
The general atmosphere which determines the majority of the interventions intended by the international community in Gaza, in at least, the coming two years, are relief efforts and with little real impact on the genuine reconstruction of the agricultural sector in Gaza Strip. Unfortunately, this situation is applicable to the economic and housing sectors which have been badly damaged.
With all respect to the role of the international organizations in assessing a large part of the destruction and damage ensued with little role played by the community and its local grassroots organizations. Add to that the reality of the split and disorganization between the governmental and non-governmental Palestinian parties, in the process of assessing the damages and the needs, and in deciding the priorities of interventions, based upon the reality of the Palestinian situation and the political and economic challenges it encounter, within a framework of a whole Palestinian national plan.
Many of those developmental international organizations have altered its characteristics of development into relief and recovery, following the international and regional agendas of Gaza support. Thus, the “whole Palestinians,” governmental or non-governmental, or small local advocacy groups, or friendly organizations, encounter a real challenge. They are required to systematically pressurize the intervention programs of the international organizations to intervene for a real reconstruction and systematic pressure on Israel to gain permits for the needed construction material to rebuild Gaza Strip and save time, effort and funds. This needs more pressure to alter the current direction and intervention strategy adopted in Gaza Strip nowadays. It is to be altered from the strategy of “eat to survive” into the strategy of “rehabilitation and reconstruction from a developmental perspective,” based upon a real assessment of community’s needs and assets.
Nowadays, Gaza Strip witnesses, unprecedented flow of dozens of programs and international organizations; relief and recovery; emergency based on humanitarian needs but not based on human rights’ needs. Meantime, a large number of the INGOs have retreated and confused in their programs and visions as they have started following unusual approaches and methods in their recent intervention that is more related to early recovery perspective. The losses inflected upon the Gaza community were not only due to the last war on Gaza but it were also due to sufferings from eight years back.
As a result of the new situation NGOs compete and confuse in their roles; the roles of the local Palestinian and international institutions overlap. The majority of the local Palestinian institutions, regardless of its names, sizes and colors, are coming to a battle on working agendas, or agendas of establishing roles and responsibilities, that will decide the forms of intervention, and trends of the local work. Unfortunately, I am all fears that the civil Palestinian agenda — which has enjoyed, so far, a reasonable national developmental features – to join the international agenda, which enjoys international features of recovery and relief of Gaza Strip. I can see this joining as pushing aside Gaza tableaux towards the international humanitarian custody that may also reach a point of political trusteeship.
There are anticipated strategic institutional alternations that could have been really started on ground. The bulk of the active Palestinian developmental societal institutions in Gaza Strip will suffer from those alterations. Moreover, the whole Palestinian society which is divided and torn apart will suffer from this condition. The first indicator in the tableaux is the competition on the “contracts market” of the international organizations’ urgent and relief programs; it will make use of the reservoir of the Palestinian institutions and their social programs. They will make use of its moral and material properties which have been accumulated in numerous developmental activities and relief proficiency, characterized by nationalism, authenticity, and sustainability, together with a reservoir of knowledge, performance, self-reliance, and by making the best use of the available community resources though limited. Many of those social values, ethics and resources have been accumulated from the first Intifada back in 1980s and earlier.
A large part of that pre-mentioned “competitive battle” will not be only about sources of funding. Rather, it could be about the policies, values, approaches and criteria of the work of the programs, a matter which will necessarily reflect upon the bulk of projects underway, as well as the future ones. It is serious that those events take place when there is no factual form of balanced partnership whether institutional or developmental or relief that may take into consideration, not only the dire needs of the poor or those who inflected damage, but also the capabilities, assets, and aspirations of the local society and its grassroots organizations, on the short and long terms.
There are no promising signs, rather there are disappointing and pessimistic ones as the Palestinian political arena is still torn apart and in crisis. There are some societal fears of deeming the current situation a de facto, and thus, to accommodate with it. That could weaken the values of the social institutional action, and dissipate the social capabilities and assets, and mislead its compass and right direction. If the Palestinian political and societal disagreement continues, it will constitute vulnerability and a real threat of any attempt to enhance and build up institutional partnership for genuine relief or development between the international and local parties that enjoy solid popular and societal backgrounds that participate in explaining the local needs and priorities as the local community and its institutions see it. When those conditions are available, it becomes easy to start a process of learning and action via comprehensive planning, monitoring, and evaluation of the whole interventions, in a real participation of all parties concerned. Add to this the necessity of opening up enough scope and flexible mechanisms for the people to speak up their minds in estimating and deciding on what they require to be done, and for building up on their assets, and practical knowledge in real life.
What worries me is that the local Palestinian institutions obviously, shamefully and deliberately lack of real form of partnership for relief or development purposes. I am also worried of the absence of an active role by the national and specialized civil society institutions. They are supposed to play versus threat of societal issues, especially that those threats have been escalating at the popular fronts, at local, regional and international levels. In the light of the weakness or absence the local, effective and influential institutional partnerships, it becomes uneasy or even hard to speak about establishing genuine balanced local, regional and international partnerships that can enhance and promote institutional and social change by and for all. Forms of present partnerships are limited to a framework of relationships, communications, coordination, nonintegrated cooperation, disorganized and confused information exchange. All this takes place in the absence of strategic political framework that organizes the whole relations of cooperation locally, regionally and internationally. The existence of this framework could shadow all efforts of relief and development, according to the persisting needs, capacities, and available capabilities at the local level, a matter which enhances relief and developmental partnership away from the state of confusion and towards a façade for the scene of the Palestinian institutions.
In the middle of the current situation, and within the national challenges of relief and development, the most serious matter at all is the position and relations of strength and influence – the situation of the institutions whether international or local governmental or non-governmental – regarding the security buffer zone which Israel has cut off from the lands of the border areas alongside of the whole Gaza Strip (Approximately 60 kilometers long and 300-1000 meters wide) confiscating fertile agricultural land of individuals and small farmers. This new de facto situation has created fear and horror among the locals of the border areas; they deserted their living places leaving their agriculture, domestic animals and live stock. What Israel names as a security buffer zone constitute, more or less, than 25% of the agricultural land, and it is where 16% of the farmers live.
It is sorrowful that the majority of the international agendas and programs, and thus, the majority of the local NGOs, do not include plans with clear features (Plans for advocacy and lobbying that goes with the reality of the situation) for intervention to reconstruct the devastated and destroyed areas, and thus replace its displaced and refugees in their homes, farms and bring them back to their normal life in what is called the security buffer zone.
Day after day, the situation in that buffer zone submits to the de facto situation imposed by the occupier (Exactly like the case of the dividing wall and the security zone in West Bank). The new situation constitutes a real threat of the strategic reservoir of natural resources which is the fertile land and underground water in Gaza Strip. What Israel calls a security buffer zone was and still is the food basket and live stock and animal source for Gazans. It is needless to say that the buffer zone with its natural resources could be the only place to extend to in case of any demographic and urban spread. .
The whole Gaza Strip scenery with all its complications includes what could be more precarious; it may pave the way to strategic threat against the population in many other pats of Gaza Strip. It may push Gazans to the corner or to the neck of the bottle which is directed towards the desert.
Ahmed Sourani is studying international development at the University of Sussex in Brighton, England. He is Director of Projects & Cooperation for the Agricultural Development Association (PARC) in Gaza, and can be reached at P.O.Box 225, Gaza | Tel: +972 8 2863041-42-43 | Fax:+972 8 2863016 | Mobile: +972 599 302704 | E-mail: haninahmed(at)hotmail.com or a.sourani(at)ids.ac.uk
